In the light of dynamic competition: should we make merger remedies more flexible?

Mergers and acquisitions shape industry competition. Effective merger remedies are important for market efficiency and consumer welfare. This paper explores the need for more flexible remedies to address changing markets after mergers. While the EU permits some flexibility with less restrictive remedies, we conceptually advance the design elements of a dual-phase, bifurcated merger control system. This system integrates ex-ante processes with more systematic and comprehensive ex-post measures. Such an approach can address the shortcomings of the current system and, consequently, holds the potential to enhance merger control in dynamic markets

Observation of Entangled States of a Fully Controlled 20-Qubit System

We generate and characterise entangled states of a register of 20 individually controlled qubits, where each qubit is encoded into the electronic state of a trapped atomic ion. Entanglement is generated amongst the qubits during the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of an Ising-type Hamiltonian, engineered via laser fields. Since the qubit-qubit interactions decay with distance, entanglement is generated at early times predominantly between neighbouring groups of qubits. We characterise entanglement between these groups by designing and applying witnesses for genuine multipartite entanglement. Our results show that, during the dynamical evolution, all neighbouring qubit pairs, triplets, most quadruplets, and some quintuplets simultaneously develop genuine multipartite entanglement. Witnessing genuine multipartite entanglement in larger groups of qubits in our system remains an open challenge.Comment: 20 pages, 4 figure

Exploitative abuse and abuse of economic dependence: what can we learn from the industrial organization approach?

This article aims to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of economic dependence and exploitative abuse through their evolution in competition law and economics and in European case law. First, while the theoretical roots of these concepts may be found in economic theory, we show that the issue has long been ignored or only reluctantly considered in competition law enforcement, mainly because of a lack of available and reliable economic criteria. Second, although its primary objective was to measure market power in an oligopoly context, we examine how current empirical industrial organization methodology allows a sophisticated measure of the economic dependence among suppliers and distributors. Third, we discuss the possibility of relying on the industrial organization approach to address these issues